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Abstract 
 
The hyperinflation era in Zimbabwe (2003-2008) eroded pensioners’ capital values and has seen pre-dollarisation retirees 
receiving paltry pension payouts from year 2009. We review global trends on foreign investments for pension funds in order to 
add input to the local debate pitting the Zimbabwe Association of Pension Funds (ZAPF) members against the Insurance and 
Pensions Commission (IPEC) on whether the Pension and Provident Fund Act [Chapter 24:6] of Zimbabwe should permit 
foreign/offshore investment. We interview ZAPF members & partners and carry out secondary analysis of data on pension 
payouts, asset management and life & pensions asset allocations and returns post-dollarisation. Findings reveal that meeting 
liquidity and diversification goals require allowances for foreign investments. ZAPF members and partners would welcome any 
level of foreign investments allowance, despite Zimbabwe offering weighted returns that are above those currently obtainable 
from foreign assets. We conclude that there is lack of confidence in the long-term sustainability of the capital values and returns 
given that the tenure of the prevailing Multi-Currency System (Dollarisation) is uncertain and hence the need to allow limited 
foreign investment by pension funds. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Pension Funds Investments Regulations in Zimbabwe 
 
The pension and provident Fund (PPF) Act [Chapter 24:09] (1976 p. 3) describes a fund as any scheme or arrangement 
the principal object of which is to provide benefits for persons who are or have been members of the scheme 
arrangement upon retirement on account of age or ill health and may also make provisions for dependents or nominees 
of deceased members. The vagaries of the years 2003-2008 left Zimbabwean pensioners with nothing to show for their 
contributions with key culprits being the; hyperinflationary economy, short sighted prescribed asset regulations, rapidly 
weakening Zimbabwe dollar currency, contagion effects of the 2003/04 banking crisis and premature asset share based 
conversion methodology of pension fund assets from the Zimbabwean dollar to the United States dollar in February 2009, 
(Chowa, et al 2013), resulting in some pensioners earning as low as US$25.00 per month from their retirement plans. 
The pre-dollarisation retirees under the state’s national pension scheme (NPS) administered by NSSA have seen gradual 
benefit increases from US$30.00 in 2009 to US$60.00/month in August 2013, making it 12% of the poverty datum line 
(PDL) level of US$505.00, (www.zimstat.co.zw). The NSSA benefits for post dollarisation retirees are however quite high 
due to the revisions done to the ceiling of insurable earnings from US$200 to US$700 in August 2013, 
(www.nssa.org.zw). 
Zimbabwe’s PPF Act forbids investments in foreign lands under section 18 stating that: “...a registered fund shall at 
all times hold its assets in Zimbabwe in investments which are realisable in Zimbabwe...” The IPEC Commissioner 
rejected proposal for offshore investments citing the slow pace of compliance with the stipulated investment guidelines, 
low uptake of the few availed prescribed assets by Pension Funds and the huddle in amending both the Insurance and 
Pensions & Provident Funds Act, (Mpofu (2010)). The ZSE is considered undervalued and registered very high returns in 
2009 (140%) and 2013 (32.6%) despite flat returns averaging 2.26% over the years 2010-2012, (www.zse.co.zw). There 
is a high concentration of shareholding for ZSE listed counters with the top 20 shareholders accounting for an average of 
at least 83% of the total issued share, of which more than 85% are institutional investors; made up of mainly local life and 
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pension funds, (CASE 2011 :p.191, 419-456). Further, Mpofu (2011) laments that; the life assurance industry remains 
technically oligopolistic with the top three companies led by Old Mutual Zimbabwe controlling 94% of the over US$1 
billion assets. These life funds are then passed on to be managed by ‘related’ asset management companies belonging 
to the parent groups. 
 
1.2 Purpose of Research 
 
The research reviews the key issues around foreign investment allowance ceiling and their possible impact on the future 
pension capital values and Zimbabwean capital markets in light of sister SADC countries and global capital market 
returns and correlations. We compare IPEC’s investment guidelines against actual pension funds and asset manager 
asset allocations in order to assess their implications to investment decision making views gathered from the interviews 
with ZAPF members. 
 
1.3 Organisation of the study 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on foreign investments by pension funds 
and global capital markets. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology used to conduct the study. Section 4 
discusses the findings and Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Review of IPEC’s investment prescriptions 
 
Governments across the world try to protect their pensioners through the enactment of regulations that support 
conservative/low risk investment policies as in passively managed funds, despite the trade-off between risk and return 
(Srinivas & Yermo (1999) and Antolin et al. (2009)). Through the use of prescribed assets (PAs) governments also gain 
access to their economy’s pension savings as well as influence investment resources into particular sectors of the 
economy. Roldos (2004) concludes that restriction on asset allocation and foreign investment are usually meant for 
macroeconomic stability but highlights the need for close monitoring and proper timing in effecting any changes. However 
Davis (2002) discourages the enforcement of tighter limits on foreign investments and suggests that it should be left to 
the market, a practice well adopted in the USA and the UK despite modest PAs levels. 
Prescribed assets requirements for Zimbabwe pension funds have been tightened from a pre dollarisation level of 
35% in 2008 to a current ceiling of anything up to 70%. IPEC’s 2013 investment guidelines for life companies and self 
administered funds proposed the following ceilings in asset allocations; prescribed assets – 70%, property – 40%, quoted 
shares – 40%, money markets – 70%, cash – 10% and not more than 5% in unquoted shares, (Mpofu, 2013a). These 
easily fit into the average global asset allocations where by close of 2011, 41% was in equities, 37% in bonds, 2% in cash 
and 20% in properties and other assets (OECD, 2011). The government of Zimbabwe has intentionally granted PA status 
to financial instruments aimed at the revival of the capital starved agriculture and manufacturing sectors but these have 
been shunned by local pension funds. This might be due to the total loss of all cash and PAs investments by pension 
funds at the turn of dollarisation, which left them with only depressed real estate and equity investments to finance their 
cash liabilities, (ZAPF, 2011). Renewed interest in the African agriculture sector from similar funds in China and the 
Middle East, (McNellis, 2009/6) might however push back confidence from local funds. 
 
2.2 Brief on Pension Funds’ foreign investments across the globe 
 
Zimbabwe’s asset allocation guidelines with no foreign investment allowance appears to be lagging behind its SADC 
peers that have set pension funds ceilings for foreign investments at 25% for South Africa, 30% for Zambia and 70% for 
Botswana, (Croce 2011). Elsewhere, Brazil and Columbia allow a certain percentage to be invested abroad while Russia 
disallows state Pension funds and allows only 20% for private Pension, (Croce, 2011). The World Bank (2008) suggest 
the need to increase the ability of fund managers to pursue risk adjusted returns as the key driver for foreign investment 
as this will protect pensioners from increased price volatilities experienced in their economies. ZAPF, (2011) advocates 
for an initial 5% with gradual increase to an offshore cap of 15% with the belief that geographic & currency diversification 
through access to international bond markets may cure the negatives from depressed local property market, low to nil 
dividends from equities and a somewhat weak correlation of returns to global benchmarks. 
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Davis (1995) and Bonvin (1997) agree that foreign investment is a means of diversification and therefore meant to 
either increase returns or reduce volatility, as predicted under the CAPM; assuming an optimal world market portfolio in a 
fully efficient and integrated capital market. A pension fund may reduce risk while enhancing return by investing in 
markets which are relatively uncorrelated (or even negatively correlated) with the investor’s domestic market contrary to 
domestic diversification because domestic securities exhibit stronger correlation as a result of their joint exposure to 
country-specific shocks, (Kurach, 2012). While the construction of an efficient portfolio with an optimal risk-return trade off 
is a major goal of investment decision making, some investors due to diversification theory believe there should be a mix 
with foreign investments as a way of hedging (Franzen 2010). Curcuru. et al, (2011) and Kurach (2012) have found an 
internationally diversified portfolio of bonds to be superior in terms of risk adjusted return relative to an international 
portfolio of equities. However rising business cycle dependence among the different countries as witnessed during the 
global financial crisis due mainly to foreign trade deepening and capital accounts liberalization may dilute the benefits.  
Reisen (1997) noted that low wealth levels associated with developing-country pensioners leads to low risk 
tolerance while older people tend to be more risk averse. Theory suggest the use of “Swap Innovation” as a way to satisfy 
the “foreign asset preference” resulting from the lack of suitable domestic investment assets and the illiquidity in domestic 
securities markets without the flow of capital to foreign assets. Bodie and Merton (2002) propose an arrangement similar 
to conventional currency swaps whereby; based on a principal amount, a small-country pension fund with domestic equity 
holding (in US dollars) could swap the local stock market return per dollar for the total return per dollar on a market-value 
weighted-average of the world stock markets with a global pension intermediary (GPI). 
 
2.3 Pension fund investments costs and constraints 
 
Stewart & Yermo (2008), Oxera (2007) and Davis (2002) agree that trustee related costs and other factors such as 
governance through the agency problem, fund size and domestic market liquidity, have had a profound bearing on 
pension funds performance. These factors have been catalysed by limited jurisdiction of the regulator in some countries 
and the influence from large Pension Funds. UNCTAD (2011/5) and similar bulletins reveals the fluid nature of investment 
policy regulations across the globe and points to the higher analytic demands of foreign investment compared to local 
investing. Mercers (2012) reveal “evidence of a domestic bias, albeit with increasing non-domestic allocations across the 
EU. Literature suggests that home bias generally observed in pension fund investment should translate into sufficient 
potential demand for domestic financial assets so as to deepen markets and develop the institutional infrastructure. 
Potential explanations of home bias vs cross-border investing have been presented as; taxes and transaction 
costs, allocation limits, information costs and asymmetries, conservative mandates, different currencies/accounting 
standards, the physical/economic distance between two countries, language or religious differences and returns 
benchmarking based on local market, (Davis (2002), Tapia (2008), Sinha and Fiestas (2011) and ASX & Rusell 
Investments (2011)). Poor legal protection of minority shareholders and even the governance on a country level also 
make foreign investment less attractive. Over the years 2008 – 2013 Zimbabwe witnessed policy inconsistencies and 
political uncertainty from the inclusive governing partners, leading to low inflows of foreign direct investment, 
(www.africaneconomicoutlook.com). 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Sampling and data 
 
This study took a survey targeting ZAPF members and partners through interviews with asset managers, pension fund 
administrators & trustees and actuarial consultants in Harare and Bulawayo metropolitans of Zimbabwe. We also carried 
out a spreadsheet analysis of the collected primary data as well as secondary data on pension payouts, ZSE equity 
returns & dividends, market capitalisation and ownership, IPEC reports and Asset Management performance surveys and 
published results. 
We assume an asset share based formula for the computation of the USD cash payout given to pensioners at any 
future date where:  
 
Asset share = (Individual accumulated credit / Total accumulated credit) * 100  
USD Payout Value = Asset share * (USD assets less reserve)  
NB. Accumulated credit is an accumulation of past contributions using fund interest earned by the fund. 
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3.2 Ethics statement 
 
This research made use of primary data that already has ethical documentation and only did secondary analysis. Any 
sensitive company experiences are masked beyond specific identification by future researchers and users of this paper. 
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
 
Statistics show that seventy percent of the local pensioners are receiving monthly pensions bellow US$60, twenty three 
percent are receiving between US$61 and UD$200 and only seven percent earn more than US$200. This indicates that 
the majority of Zimbabwe’s pensioners are living in poverty given the PDL pegged at US$505 by December 2013 
(www.zimstat.org.zw). Thus; fund managers should invest wisely to avoid any pension value reduction and increase the 
current pension levels. The pension conversion process would have granted favourable individual benefits if foreign 
investments were permitted before dollarisation as suggested by the World Bank (2008). 
Most fund managers advocated for a higher local asset weight in their portfolios with seventy eight percent of 
respondents saying they would add some foreign assets in their portfolios, while eleven percent exhibit total “foreign 
asset preference” and would rather hold a wholly foreign portfolio as they view the local investments as too risky. We also 
observed some “patriotism” or full bias towards the local market among the other eleven percent who view the associated 
uncertainties and complexities with the foreign markets as too demanding and would rather maintain their local portfolios. 
Low levels of liquidity on the ZSE, depressed property market and limited scope of PAs have left the funds locked in 
certain assets for too long, thereby limiting portfolio revisions and overall returns. These responses indicate the presence 
of favourable market forces (Davis 2002) whereby opening up foreign investments will only externalise modest amounts 
of capital, which will be made up of mostly new cash from subscribing members and returns from existing assets. 
Properties and equities dominate life and pension funds portfolios making up 36% apiece on the total life and 
pension assets as shown in Table 1 below. Zimbabwe’s total life and pensions’ assets are just above US$3 billion, with 
major pension funds portfolios highly weighted in the “risky” capital market stocks and the bulk of their funds locked in 
properties. The high proportion of cash & other investments indicates some; limited investment options, tight liquidity in 
the market and the scarcity of prescribed assets (which are normally short-term assets, hence holdings across all funds 
at an overall 1% against a ceiling of 70%). Table 1 shows some evident violations of the current IPEC asset allocations 
guideline for capital market (equity), cash & other investments and properties (shown in bold font). This weakens ZAPF’s 
bargaining power for foreign investments with IPEC, as the latter has stressed on compliance with the laid down upper 
limits. 
 
Table 1: Summary of assets held by life and pension funds in Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
Source: Spreadsheet analysis of Secondary Data (Mpofu (2013b and 2013c)) 
 
Asset management companies are usually appointed to manage part or the entire non-property pension funds’ assets 
hence the need to analyse the financials of this special group. The asset allocations for Zimbabwe Asset Managers over 
the years 2010 – 2013 shows that their investments are predominantly equities (78%) and money market (20%) with cash 
and other alternatives making up the remaining 2%. The average asset manager returns for 2012 and 2013 were 10.2% 
and 21% respectively, with a whooping average cumulative return since 2009 of 219% and outperforming the ZSE 
Value $millions 49        119      34        15      4             221       
% 22% 54% 15% 7% 2% 100%
Value $millions 57          204        91          33        13             398         
% 14% 51% 23% 8% 3% 100%
Value $millions 528        147        50          268      9               1,002      
% 53% 15% 5% 27% 1% 100%
Value $millions 474        617        141        179      16             1,427      
% 33% 43% 10% 13% 1% 100%
Value $millions 1,108     1,087     316        495      42             3,048      
% 36% 36% 10% 16% 1% 100%
% 40% 40% 70% 15% 70%IPEC UPPER LIMIT
 TOTALS
Asset Classs
Property
Capital 
Market
Money 
Market
Cash + 
Other
Prescribed 
assets
Total per 
Fund
Insured Self 
Admininistred PFs
Type 
of 
Fund
Self Admininistred 
Funds
Stand Alone Funds
Life Companies
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industrial index’s 198.5%. Properties (capital + rental) yielded an average of above 15% while the local money market is 
proved very dear given returns of between 9 – 14% on the US dollar per annum for the period 2012-2013. Since 
dollarisation a total of only 13 out of the 62 active listings on the ZSE managed to pay dividends as most companies are 
still in dire need of capitalisation. For liquidity purposes, this is very unattractive for pension funds that require more of the 
dividends than capital appreciation (ZAPF, 2011), thereby forcing pension funds to liquidate other assets. We also 
observe fund manager dominance in the asset management industry, where the top three asset managers control 80% of 
the US$1.1 billion of the total funds under management (FUM) and this point to the larger asset managers dictating the 
mix of foreign investments for the general market if permitted. 
Given that most overseas investments earn an average annual return of less than 10% (shown in Tapia (2008)), it 
will be difficult for local fund managers with foreign allocations to beat a wholly localised portfolio. However due to varying 
economic climate, Zimbabwe has a higher overall risk attributable to some poor performing local investments while the 
limited asset classes makes it difficult for local fund managers to stabilise the risk and return of assets as shown by 
negative asset manager weighted average returns of 1.32% in 2011 and average annual ZSE index underperformance 
rate of 38% over the years 2009-2013. Thus foreign investment allowance may bring flexibility to fund managers and 
enhance the demand for savings due to the reduction in the perceived loss of savings arising out of any future currency 
conversion process.  
The geographical preferences of local fund managers appear to be limited to their knowledge of the global 
markets. Fifty percent of the ZAPF members would invest within the SADC region; thirty one percent prefer emerging 
markets such as Brazil and India, while the remaining nineteen percent would rather invest in tax haven countries such as 
Dubai and Switzerland. This shows an appetite for higher returns from developing SADC and emerging markets as well 
as low taxation and transactions cost associated with tax havens. However given that Zimbabwe as an economy in 
recovery did not feel much of the global financial crisis, foreign investments may expose local funds to the systemic risks 
of the world markets that are currently depressed. Given the undesirability of shortfall risks to the already depleted capital 
values, local fund managers should be careful in assuming the perceived diversification benefits. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
 
We concur with Seidman (1982)’s 30 year old assertion that Zimbabwe need to capture and redirect the domestically 
generated surpluses to finance a long-term industrial strategy designed to spread productive employment and raise living 
standards. Given the current low liquidity levels in Zimbabwe, the country needs any surplus cash to be injected into the 
ailing sectors of the economy as well as increase liquidity for the domestic financial assets, hence the need for controlled 
foreign investment allowance. 
Lessons of the past decade indicate that local assets are exposed to possible changes in the currency regime, 
limited scope of assets and high implied volatility, making some allowance for foreign investment for hedging purposes 
most welcome. The current IPEC guidelines gives room for flexibility among fund managers, but should be implemented 
more on the “new cash” given the current liquidity crunch, so that funds do not have to liquidate existing assets in order to 
abide by the guidelines. The current standoff is hinged on some parliamentary amendments to the Insurance and 
Pension & Provident Funds Act, compliance with scarce/unattractive prescribed assets and revisions to current asset 
allocations which may require time before pension funds are allowed to invest in foreign assets, unless there is some 
expedience and flexibility from the regulator (IPEC) and law makers. 
The current dispensation of dollarisation gives our pension funds a currency hedge on entry into foreign markets 
despite the uncertainty in the host nation currency on exit and this could act as a positive catalyst to foreign investment. 
We conclude that IPEC asset allocations are conservative enough to hedge against downside investment risk and that 
this could be enhanced through foreign investment to further protect the interests of pensioners and active members as 
well as raise consumer confidence in committing to savings. 
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